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"Make Your Own Kind of Music":
Queer Student Groups and
the First Amendment
Doni Gewirtzmant

As openly gay and lesbian students become a more regular presence in public high schools, students in many schools have started lesbian and gay student organizations. In response, some school districts
and state legislatures have attempted to prevent the clubs from meeting,
either through categorical bans on all extracurricular groups or
through legislation specifically designed to prevent the gay clubs from
meeting. This Comment examines the First Amendment issues raised by
these efforts. It argues that the Supreme Court's current approach to
student speech, which focuses on whether the speech is school sponsored and on the application of public forum doctrine, lacks an underlying rationale and leads to inconsistent outcomes. In its place, the
author urges the Court to adopt a mission-based test that examines the
relationship between the regulation on speech and the educational purpose underlying the activity. Because student clubs generally exist to
promote self-exploration and foster the development of individual identity, this new test would extend First Amendment protection to gay and
lesbian student groups.
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It may be rough going
Just to do your thing's the hardest thing to do
But you 've got to
Make your own kind of music
Sing your own special song
Make your own kind of music
Even if nobody else sings along
-MamaCass 1
INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 1995, Kelli Peterson, a senior at East High School in
Salt Lake City, decided to form a gay/straight alliance at her school.2
The club was certainly not the country's first3 and was one of a number
of clubs at the school that focused on issues related to group identity.
The Salt Lake City school district responded to the alliance with
immediate hostility. In order to restrict the alliance's ability to meet
while complying with the terms of the Equal Access Act,4 a federal law
constraining the ability of school districts to deny recognition selectively to school-affiliated student organizations, the school board
banned all non-curriculum-related clubs from Salt Lake City public
schools.5 Students, in turn, responded with walkouts and protests against
the board's decision, 6 objecting not to the attack on the queer7 student
club but to the widespread effects of the ban on other student clubs. 8 A
small group of students responded differently, starting a club known as
SAFE-Students Against Faggots Everywhere.9

1. MAMA CASS, Make Your Own Kind of Music, on Music FROM THE MOTION PICTURE
BEAUTIFUL THING (MCA Records 1996).
2. See Mark Walsh, Gay Students' Request Spurs Board to Cut Clubs, EDUC. WK., Feb. 28,
1996, at 6.
3. See Kelli Kristine Armstrong, The Silent Minority Within a Minority: Focusing on the Needs
of Gay Youth in our Public Schools, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L REV. 67, 89-90 (1994); Warren J.
Blumenfeld, Gay/Straight Alliances: Transforming Pain into Pride, in THE GAY TEEN: EDUCATIONAL
PRACTICE AND THEORY FOR LESBIAN, GAY AND BISEXUAL ADOLESCENTS 211, 212-13 (Gerald
Unks ed., 1995).
4. 20 u.s.c. §§ 4071-4074 (1994).
5. See Walsh, supra note 2, at 6.
6. See Samuel Autman et al., S.L. Students Rally, Rail and Rebel, SALT LAKE CITY Tarn., Feb.
24, 1996, at Al; Robert Bryson, More than 1,000 Protest Club Ban, SALT LAKE CITY TRIB., Mar. 3,
1996, at Cl.
7. I use the word "queer" as an inclusive, nonderogatory term to encompass gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transgendered individuals.
8. See Autman, supra note 6, at A 1.
9. See Samuel Autman, Club Ban Sparks Fear, Loathing, SALT LAKE CITY Turn., Feb. 22,
1996, at Al.
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Evidently, the school board's action was not sufficient to satisfy
Utah state legislators. Following a closed door meeting, 10 Utah legislators passed S.B. 1003. 11 After finding that "certain activities, programs,
and conduct are ... detrimental to the physical, emotional, psychological, and moral well being of students and faculty," 12 the statute states
that "local school boards shall deny access to any student organization
or club whose program and activities would materially or substantially: (i) encourage criminal or delinquent conduct; (ii) promote bigotry; (iii) or involve human sexuality." 13 A lawsuit against the Salt Lake
City school board's actions is underway,1 4 and similar controversies have
begun to erupt in other states. 15
If reviewing courts follow the most recent Supreme Court decision
addressing the First Amendment rights of high school students,
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 16 they will likely apply an
overly circumscribed analysis that turns on whether or not the speech
of the club is "school sponsored." 17 If the speech of the clubs is considered school-sponsored speech, courts will subject the state's action to
minimal constitutional scrutiny, creating a high likelihood that the ban
will survive a constitutional challenge. Alternatively, if the reviewing
court finds that the speech is not school sponsored, it will apply a more
exacting type of constitutional review that focuses on whether the
speech of the clubs would constitute a "material or substantial disruption" to the operation of the school. 18
This Comment argues that the Court's current approach to student
speech issues, which focuses on school sponsorship and public forum
doctrine, is fundamentally misguided. By conditioning constitutional
protection on facial considerations of sponsorship, the Court has
IO.

See Dan Harrie & Judy Fahys, Lawmakers Settle Secret Meeting Suit, SALT LAKE CITY

Tum., Feb. 20, I997, at Al.

II. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 53A-3-419 (1996).
12. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-3-419(2)(a) (I996).
13. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 53A-3-419(2)(a)(i)-(iii) (1996) (emphasis added). The statute grants
local school boards the authority to determine whether a given club falls within the definition of the
law. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-3-419 (2)(b) (1996). The Alliance continues to meet without
formal school recognition or funding, but it meets after school, when Utah's schools become public
forums under a state statute. See Katherine Kapos, Legacy of Utah's Gay-Club Furor; Policy Could
Allow Gay Clubs, SALT LAKE CITY TRIB., Jan. 10, 1997, at DI.
14. See Civil-Rights Groups Sue Over School-Clubs Ban, SALT LAKE CITY TRIB., Mar. 21,
1998, at Al.
15. See David Olinger, School Gay Rights Group Sues, DENVER POST, Jan. 23, 1998, at Cl;
Renate Robey, School District to Recognize Gay, Heterosexual Club, DENVER POST, Feb. 28, 1998, at
Bl;Arizona Legislators Pattern Gay-Club Ban on Utah Law, SALT LAKE CITY TR!B., Dec. 25, I996,
at A23; see also Rachel D'Oro, Tempest Brews Over Gay Student Club, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS,
Nov. 22, 1996, at 18.
I6. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
17. See id. at 270-73.
18. See Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Community Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
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created a constitutional doctrine that lacks a compelling rationale. I
argue that the Court's two stated explanations for focusing on school
sponsorship--protecting the school's proprietary interests and minimizing the risk that external observers will attribute student speech to
the school-do not adequately explain the broad discretion granted to
school authorities. In the process, the doctrine creates unjustifiable inconsistencies between the speech rights of high school and college students.
This Comment suggests that, instead of focusing on sponsorship,
the Court should adopt a constitutional test that inquires into the function of educational institutions and ascertains the nature of the relationship between the regulation of speech and the mission of the
educational institution.1 9 A mission-based test would allow the Court to
make principled distinctions among different types of school activities
and to ground student speech doctrine in social commitments to First
Amendment values and organizational function, considerations that are
already present at a subtextual level in prior precedent. While the proliferation of queer student groups inevitably raises constitutional issues
related to freedom of association, prior restraint,20 state action doctrine,21 the relationship between sexuality and the First Amendment,22
and statutory questions under the Equal Access Act, 23 these analyses are
beyond the scope of this Comment.
Parts I and II give a history of the Court's major student speech
decisions and provide a brief overview of public forum doctrine. Part III
examines the Hazelwood decision's use of public forum doctrine and its
19. I derive this suggested approach from the work of Professor Robert C. Post See generally
Robert C. Post, Behveen Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Fon1m,
34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987) [hereinafter Post, Behveen Governance and Management]; Robert C.
Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267 (1991)
[hereinafter Post, Racist Speech]; Robert Post, ReC11perating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1249 (1995) [hereinafter Post, ReC11perating First Amendment Doctrine].
20. See Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1540-41 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
school policy requiring written permission to distribute non-school-sponsored materials was not an
unconstitutional prior restraint on speech).
21. See, e.g., Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131F.3d241 (Isl Cir. 1997) (holding that high school
yearbook's decision not to run certain advertisements was not state action).
22. See generally Daniel S. Alter, Confronting the Queer and Present Danger, 22 HUM. RTs. 22
(1995); Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695 (1993); Brent Hunter
Allen, Note, The First Amendment and Homosexual Expression: The Need for an Expanded
Interpretation, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1073 (1994).
23. In fact, it is far more likely that litigants will bring challenges to club bans under the Equal
Access Act rather than the First Amendment See, e.g., Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85
F.3d 839 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding after-school club's Christian officer requirement under the Equal
Access Act); Ceniceros v. Board of Trustees of the San Diego Unified Sch. Dist, 66 F.3d 1535 (9th
Cir. 1995) (holding that school's refusal to allow student religious club to meet during school period
violated the Act); Pope v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 12 F.3d 1244 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that
school's refusal to certify student Bible club violated the Act).
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introduction of sponsorship into First Amendment jurisprudence. Part
IV examines how a reviewing court might treat the Utah statute under
current doctrine. Part V argues that there is no underlying rationale for
using school sponsorship to determine the free speech rights of student
clubs, while Part VI argues that the Court should adopt a mission-based
rationale instead of focusing on sponsorship. Finally, Part VII applies
the suggested mission-based test to student groups, arguing that gay and
lesbian student groups are entitled to constitutional protection.
I

Tinker TO Fraser:
THE EVOLUTION OF STUDENT SPEECH DOCTRINE
Before exploring how a reviewing court might approach the dilemma created by Utah's ban, some doctrinal background is necessary to
explain the Court's current approach to student speech. The Court's
four major cases in the area-Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,24 Board of Education v. Pico, 25 Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 26 and Hazelwood-provide a starting
point for examining the difficult constitutional issues raised by the creation and continued presence of queer student organizations in public
high schools.
The Supreme Court's student speech jurisprudence has developed
along three distinct yet highly interrelated paths. First, the Court's discussion about the mission of American education shifted emphasis to
stress public education's role in the inculcation of values,27 while deemphasizing education's role in fostering independent thought. Second,
the Court increased the level of deference accorded to school authorities
in their decision to restrict student speech.28 Third, the Court introduced
public forum doctrine as the operative mode of analysis for most
24. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
25. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
26. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
27. See id. at 681 (identifying "society's ... interest in teaching students the boundaries of
socially appropriate behavior"); Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1540 (7th Cir.
1996) (recognizing school concerns with "the inculcation of civility (including manners) and
traditional moral, social, and political norms"); Virgil v. School Bd., 862 F.2d 1517, 1520 (I Ith Cir.
1989) (recognizing "the central role of public schools in transmitting values necessary to the
development of an informed citizenry"); Broussard v. School Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1536 (E.D. Va.
1992) (recognizing school's legitimate "concern for values and decency in addition to school
order"). This progression can be seen as a philosophical evolution from the pedagogical perspectives
of John Dewey to Emile Durkheim. While Dewey argued that the schools were "an environment that
molds citizenship and prepares people for democracy," Durkheim saw in schools ''the need for social
institutions to establish a core of consistent homogenizing values as a basis to enable children to
develop their own autonomy." Michael Rebell, Tinker, Hazelwood and the Remedial Role of the
Courts in Education Litigation, 69 ST. JOHN'S L REV. 539, 544-45 (1995).
28. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267.

1136

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1131

student speech cases, ostensibly abandoning its earlier mission-based inquiry.29 The eventual result is a doctrine that is mired in needless complexity and relies upon dubious facial commitments to governmental
property interests or concerns that student speech might be attributed
to the school.
A.

Tinker v. Des Moines

In its initial foray into the realm of student speech, the Court focused its constitutional lens upon the mission of the school, assigning a
mission to secondary school education and fashioning a constitutional
test to match it. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District,30 the Court struck down the suspensions of two high
school students and one junior high student for wearing black annbands
to protest the Vietnam War. 31 The students, all siblings, planned the
protest in advance and were not affiliated with any school-sponsored
organization or activity. Setting the high-water mark for student liberties, the Court held that schools could prohibit student speech only if
"engaging in the forbidden conduct would 'materially and substantially
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school. "'32 Because the lower court did not make the requisite finding, the symbolic speech of the annbands was entitled to
constitutional protection.
The Court's ruling in Tinker was one more skinnish in a longstanding historical battle over the mission and goals of American education .33 While some saw education as a socialization mechanism designed
to convey selected values, others saw it as an opportunity to expose
students to new ideas and options for the future. 34 The Tinker decision
took a clear position in the conflict, stating that "educating the young
for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its
source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.ms The Court also mentioned "this Nation's
29. See id. at 270.
30. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
31. See id. at 514.
32. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 747, 749 (1966)) (emphasis added).
33. See generally AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987).
34. See Rosemary C. Salomone, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake of
Hazelwood, 26 GA. L. REV. 253, 257 (1992) {"[T]his ideology of schooling contains an inherent
tension between individual freedom and collective interests."). For another perspective on the
ideological history of American schooling, see Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0. Hafen, The
Hazelwood Progeny: Autonomy and Student Expression in the /990's, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 379
(1995).
35. 393 U.S. at 507 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1943)).
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repudiation of the principle that a State might so conduct its schools as
to 'foster a homogenous people"'36 and suggested that society can best
discover truth "out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any
kind of authoritative selection."37 In addition, the Tinker Court placed a
significant constitutional hurdle on the ability_ of school authorities by
recognizing that "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbancems was an insufficient institutional motive for speech regulation
within the school community.39
The Court did not, however, entirely abandon the notion that
school authorities have a legitimate interest in restricting the speech of
their students. The "material or substantial disruption" test acknowledges that there is a point at which a school's disciplinary needs and
larger objectives outweigh a student's interest in free speech. Because,
by their very nature, material or substantial disruptions prevent meaningful communication from occurring, the Tinker test is not only a
speech-friendly constitutional approach but also reflects a constitutional paradigm that sets limitations on speech that obstructs an organization's mission. If a school's mission is to foster dialogue and discourse
as part of a search for truth, the Tinker Court argued, schools may restrict speech only when the speech impedes that mission. The Tinker
test thus represents the Court's attempt to synthesize institutional realities with constitutional mandates.
B.

Board of Education v. Pico

The first chinks in the Tinker armor began to appear in Board of
Education v. Pico, 40 decided in 1982. A plurality of the Court held that
a school district's decision to remove books from high school and junior
high school libraries violated the First Amendment.41 The school district
identified the books, which included Richard Wright's classic Black Boy
and a compilation of short stories by African-American writers edited
by Langston Hughes,42 as "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Sem[i]tic,
and just plain filthy." 43 The district went on to place the removal of the
books in the context of an educational mission: "It is our duty, our
moral obligation, to protect the children in our schools from this moral
danger as surely as from physical and medical dangers." 44
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 511 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)).
Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
Id. at 508.
Id. at 514.
457 U.S. 853 (1982).
See id. at 872.
See id. at 856-57 n.3.
Id. at 857.
Id.
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The plurality opinion, one of seven in the case, "is a studied lesson
in Court confusion and ambivalence." 45 While the decision turned primarily on whether the First Amendment extends to guarantee students
access to information,46 Pico is doctrinally significant for our purposes
in two respects. First, the Court suggested in dicta that courts should
generally view the decisions of school districts with great deference.
"[P]ublic education in our Nation is committed to the control of local
and state authorities, and ... federal courts should not ordinarily
'intervene in the daily operation of school systems.'"47 This deference
represents a significant departure from the level of judicial scrutiny the
Court suggested in Tinker, in which the Court presumed that speech restrictions were invalid unless the school could demonstrate that the
speech would cause a material or substantial disruption.
Second, the Court began to hint at an alternative mission for
American education that emphasized the inculcation of specific values
rather than the importance of exposing students to a broad range of
intellectual and cultural perspectives. "We are therefore in full agreement ... that local school boards must be permitted 'to establish and
apply their curriculum in such a way as to transmit community values,'
and that 'there is a legitimate and substantial community interest in
promoting respect for authority and traditional values be they social,
moral, or political.'"48 While the Court did not entirely abandon the
institutional objectives outlined in Tinker, by reminding school districts
that "the First Amendment ... does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
orthodoxy over the classroom,"49 the Court nevertheless sowed the doctrinal seeds for a shift away from Tinker.
C.

Bethel School District v. Fraser

Decided just four years after Pico, Bethel School District v. Fraser5°
presented the Court with an opportunity to reaffirm the relevance of
Tinker's material or substantial disruption test. At a school assembly
convened to elect officers for student government, a student gave a
nominating speech for a fellow student that was laced with sexual innuendo.51 The school responded by suspending the student for three days

45. Salomone, supra note 34, at 264.
46. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 868.
47. Id. at 864 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 870 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
50. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
51. The full text of the speech is as follows:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character is
firm-but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.
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and removing him from the list of candidates for graduation speaker.52
Relying on Tinker, the district and circuit courts overturned the suspension as a violation of the student's First Amendment rights. 53
After acknowledging that the Tinker decision was still good law,54
the Court proceeded to tear it to shreds. Embracing Pico's redefinition
of the mission of American public education, the Court stated, "[Public
education] must inculcate the habits and ... values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of selfgovernment in the community and the nation."55 Backtracking on the
question of school discretion, the Court stated that "[t]he determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in the school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school district."56 Ostensibly
distinguishing Tinker as a case about political speech,57 the Court found
that the school board had full authority to restrict "lewd and indecent"
speech because such speech was "wholly inconsistent with the
'fundamental values' of public school education."58
The most surprising element of the Fraser opinion is the lack of
an operable constitutional test. Rather than following the test it articulated in Tinker, the Court conducted a Tinker-like inquiry into the mission of public school education and suggested that extending First
Amendment rights to the school assembly would conflict with the organizational purpose of value inculcation. In so doing, the Court made
no attempt to limit the holding to obscene speech or to provide any
principles to guide lower courts as to when student speech impedes organizational objectives. Furthermore, the Court made no effort to confine or define the continued relevance of the Tinker test. 59 The Court's
ambiguity in this area had serious implications in terms of the degree of
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an
issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives hard, pushing and
pushing until finally-he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even the climax, for each and every one of
you.
So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice president-he'll never come between you and the best
our high school can be.
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
52. See id at 678.
53. See id at 679-80.
54. See id at 680.
55. Id. at 681 (quoting c. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HtSTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
228 (1968)).
56. Id. at 683.
57. Id at 680. Fraser's attempt to distinguish Tinker on the basis of political speech is ultimately
unconvincing since the student speech in Fraser occurred at a schoolwide forum on self-government.
58. Id. at 685-86.
59. The Court could have applied the Tinker test and still reached the desired outcome. In his
concurrence, Justice Brennan applied the Tinker test and found the speech "disruptive" and therefore
found the suspension constitutional. See id. at 688-90 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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discretion granted to school authorities to regulate student speech. By
failing to clarify the appropriate standard of review, the Court implicitly suggested a weakness in the affirmative proof of "disturbance" required under Tinker. 60
In sum, between 1969 and 1986, the Court consistently inquired
into the institutional mission of American schools to determine the
boundaries of First Amendment liberties. As the Court's articulation of
that mission began to shift from producing independent thinkers to articulating cultural values, the level of discretion the Court granted to
school authorities to restrict student speech began to grow.
II
PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE: THE INTRODUCTION OF
A CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO STUDENT SPEECH

The retreat from Tinker that the Court began in Pico and Fraser
culminated in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. 61 In Hazelwood,
the Court affirmed the constitutionality of institutional censorship of a
school-sponsored newspaper. 62 Staff members of a high school newspaper, the Spectrum, contested their school's decision to withhold publication of two stories. One story dealt with student experiences with
pregnancy, the other with the impact of divorce on students in the
school. 63 Students wrote and edited the paper as part of a journalism
course for which they received curricular credit, page proofs of each
issue were submitted to the principal for his approval, and the local
board supplied the majority of the operating funds for the paper.64
In order to understand the Court's decision, it is necessary to examine briefly public forum doctrine, an analytic tool that began to assume great importance in First Amendment analysis during the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts.65 Public forum doctrine focuses on creating a series of categorical tests based upon the medium or locale where the
speech takes place. ln the process, forum analysis makes a distinction
between viewpoint discrimination and content discrimination. 66
60. See C. Thomas Dienes & Annemargaret Connolly, When Students Speak: Judicial Review
in the Academic Marketplace, 7 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 343, 367 (1989) ("[A]t best, the Chief
Justice urged a rationality standard of review; alternatively, he urged complete judicial abdication of
first amendment review.").
61. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
62. See id at 262.
63. See id at 263.
64. See id at 262-63.
65. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985); Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). The doctrine can be traced to two
sources: Harry Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. Cr. REV. I
(1965) and Hague v. C!O, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
66. The Court's current approach to First Amendment doctrine evaluates regulations on speech
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Viewpoint discrimination is subject to strict constitutional scrutiny regardless of the forum classification,67 while content discrimination is
dependent upon the nature of the forum. Forum analysis determines the
state's ability to engage in content discrimination by dividing public
spaces into three separate categories for the purpose of evaluating
content-based restrictions: the public (or traditional) forum, the limited
(or designated) public forum, and the non-public forum. 68
Traditional public forums, described as places that "by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate,"69 receive the highest level of constitutional protection for
speech. In such forums, which include streets and parks, the government
may not place absolute prohibitions on speech and may only institute
content-based restrictions if they are "necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and ... [are] narrowly drawn to achieve that end."70
Speech in public forums is subject to reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions.71
The second category, the limited public forum, is created when a
government entity opens its property for use as a place of expressive
activity for a limited amount of time or for a limited class of speakers.72
For example, in Widmar v. Vincent,13 the Court held that a university
created a limited public forum for student groups that wished to meet on
campus.74 In identifying limited public fornms, the Court does not look
to the tradition of the forum, but to ''the policy and practice of the
government.ms If the government has established the confines of the
forum, and the speech falls within the purpose of the forum, contentbased restrictions are subject to the same scrutiny as in traditional public
forums. 76
depending upon whether they seek to regulate the content or viewpoint of the speech. Content-based
discrimination targets the subject matter of the speech while viewpoint discrimination targets the
speaker's views on the subject. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 830-31 (1995).
67. See id. ("Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be
unconstitutional.").
68. A comprehensive analysis or critique of public forum doctrine is beyond the scope of this
Comment For analyses and critiques of public forum doctrine, see generally Post, Between
Governance and Management, supra note 19; Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading
Nature ofPublic Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L .
REV. 1219 (1984).
69. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
70. Id.
71. See id. and cases cited.
72. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
73. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
74. See id. at 277.
75. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)
(emphasis added); see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988).
76. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
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All other forums are considered non-public. Within this category,
the government may place restrictions "based on subject matter and
speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light
of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.m7 The
government's rationale does not need to be the "most reasonable or the
only reasonable limitation."78 Most important, unlike the other categories, "a finding of strict incompatibility between the nature of the
speech or the identity of the speaker and the functioning of the nonpublic forum is not mandated."79
ill

Haze/wood's

REASONING AND ANALYSIS

Hazelwood represents the Court's definitive attempt to reconcile
two conflicting doctrinal objectives established by precedent. On one
hand, Justice White's opinion began with the oft-quoted observation
from Tinker that public school students "do not 'shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate'"80 and affirmed that schools may not sanction students "merely
for expressing their personal views on the school premises"81 unless the
school satisfies the demands of the Tinker test. At the same time, the
Court went on to validate the primary tenets of Fraser: Schools need
not tolerate speech that threatens the school's mission,82 and school
boards have peremptory authority to determine the scope of permissible speech "in the classroom or in school assembly."83
Haze/wood's attempt at reconciling precedent involved the use of
two fundamentally flawed and highly interrelated concepts: public forum
doctrine and a constitutional dichotomy between "school-sponsored"
and "school-tolerated"84 speech. A critique of both concepts reveals a
school speech doctrine that is almost impossible to apply with any sort
of constitutional consistency and without threatening the integrity of
core First Amendment values.

77. Cornelius, 413 U.S. at 806.
78. Id. at 808.
79. Id.
80. 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969)).
81. Id.
82. See id. at 266; see also id. at 272 ("Otherwise, the schools would be unduly constrained
from fulfilling their role as 'a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and helping him to adjust normally to his
environment."') (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
83. Id. at 267 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
84. See Rosemary C. Salomone, Public Forum Doctrine and the Perils of Categorical Thinking:
Lessons.from Lamb's Chapel, 24 N.M. L. REV. I, 19 (1994).
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A. Hazelwood 's Use of Public Forum Doctrine
For the first time in a case involving student speech, the Court applied public forum analysis to determine whether speech is constitutionally protected. Examining the Spectrum, the Court identified the paper
as a non-public forum because there was no evidence of school policy or
practice "to open the pages of Spectrum to 'indiscriminate use' ... by
its student reporters and editors, or by the student body generally."85 As
part of its inquiry into the paper's role as a vehicle for self-expression,
the Court relied on the paper's close relationship to the school curriculum and the trial court's finding that the journalism teacher and the
principal had final authority over the content of the paper. 86
By applying public forum doctrine in Hazelwood, the Court utilized
an analysis that was developed to answer one question-whether the
government must grant equal access to government property and media
for external speakers-to answer a very different question: whether
speakers from within the school environment are entitled to protection
from content- and viewpoint-based discrimination. 87 The two circumstances involve fundamentally different constitutional considerations.
When applying public forum doctrine to external speakers, the
Court has consistently focused on the government's ownership of the
property to justify content-based regulation. 88 "[T]he state, no less than
a private owner of property, has the power to preserve the property
under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated."89 If the
government dedicates the property to free expression, either by policy
or tradition, the state is restricted from engaging in content-based exclusions. Otherwise, public forum doctrine treats the government like
any other private business, with wide latitude to restrict speech based
upon content.90
With internal speecli, the rationale used to justify exclusion of outside speakers under public forum doctrine becomes highly suspect. If
government's power to regulate speech under public forum doctrine is
directly tied to government ownership of property, this would suggest
that the government has nearly unlimited ability to impose content
regulations on individuals that spend the bulk of their time, as
85. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270.
86. See id. at 268-69.
87. See supra note 66 for an explanation of the distinction between content- and viewpointbased discrimination. See generally Post, Between Governance and Management, supra note 19. ·
88. See id. at 1766.
89. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (quoting Greer
v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976)). For a critique of the Court's focus on property rights, see
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 821-22 (1985) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) ("[T]he mere fact that the Government acts as property owner should not exempt it
from the First Amendment.").
90. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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government employees or as students, on government property that is
not a designated public forum. Suppose, for example, that the
Department of Health ap.d Human Services, concerned that its employees are not spending enough time discussing the major social problems
of the day, barred all of its employees, when on HHS property and engaging in HHS business, from any and all speech related to the topics of
sports and entertainment. Courts would likely find this type of contentbased regulation of internal speech unconstitutional. 91 But why? If we
accept that the State may engage in content-based exclusion of internal
speakers merely because it owns the property, such a regulationwhether it involves HHS, the Tinker armbands, or queer student
groups-should withstand constitutional scrutiny.
The application of public forum doctrine to internal speech leads
to skewed constitutional outcomes. By applying a doctrine whose rationale is based on the government's role as a property owner to cases
where the government functions as an employer or as a provider of social communities, courts are destined to overlook constitutional values
of free expression and open political discourse. The potential for undesirable outcomes forced the Hazelwood Court to explore creative constitutional alternatives, adding confusion to an already muddled area of
law.
B.

Hazelwood and School-Sponsored Speech

Taken by itself, the use of public forum doctrine in Hazelwood
likely would have overruled Tinker. 92 If internal speech, without regard
to the affiliation of the speaker, was regulated within the broad confines
of the non-public forum, the school would have the same right to regulate student armbands as it would have to deny access to an Avon lady
who wants to make an on-site presentation to faculty and staff.
To avoid this outcome, the Hazelwood Court added a schoolspecific corollary to its application of public forum doctrine. Addressing
the question it avoided in Fraser, the Court clarified the scope of the
Tinker test by making a crucial distinction between school-sponsored
and school-tolerated speech. The Court restricted application of the
Tinker test to school-tolerated speech, defined as "a student's personal
expression that happens to occur on the school premises."93 Hazelwood,
alternatively, dealt with school-sponsored speech, "educators' authority
91. This is, obviously, an overly simplistic example. In an educational context, a court would
likely decide this type of case under Pickering v. Board ofEducation, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), examining
whether the school employee's relationship with the local board was close enough to require
"personal loyalty and confidence" in order to function properly. Id at 570.
92. See Cornelius, 413 U.S. at 823 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court's
application of public forum doctrine would overrule Tinker).
93. Haze/wood, 484 U.S. at 271.
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over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other
expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public
might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.'>94
The Court defined the scope of school-sponsored speech to include
any activity, inside or outside a traditional classroom setting, that is
"supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular
knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences."95 Hence, the
Tinker test is not applicable to determine ''when a school may refuse to
lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student expression. "96 High schools can engage in speech regulation connected to
"school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."97 By making the
degree of constitutional scrutiny dependent upon school sponsorship,
the Hazelwood Court saved Tinker from the fatal effects of public forum doctrine. The end result, however, only replaced one doctrinal tangle with another.
The problematic questions raised by the use of school sponsorship
as a governing constitutional principle are readily apparent in the case
of high school student organizations. Should the Court have decided
Tinker differently if the Tinker children's protest had been part of an
activity sponsored by the "Oppose the Vietnam War" club at school?
Would constitutional protection for such a club hinge on whether a faculty member supervised a protest organized by the club? Or whether the
school established the club for the ostensible purpose of imparting particular leadership and organizing skills? Are voluntary extracurricular
student organizations fundamentally different from the schoolwide assembly in Fraser or the newspaper in Hazelwood, which was distributed
throughout the school? Furthermore, how should a court analyze an extracurricular queer student group's decision to wear pink triangles in
class?
In sum, the Hazelwood Court introduced two significant doctrinal
elements into the dialogue over constitutional protections for student
speech. First, Hazelwood applied public forum doctrine to inl:raorganizational speech, even though the doctrine was developed to establish constitutional boundaries for access by outsiders to government
property. Second, by utilizing the sponsorship/toleration distinction to
determine the degree of First Amendment protection, the Court ostensibly abandoned the mission-based analysis it had advanced in previous
cases in favor of a hybrid categorical analysis.
94.

95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id. at272-73.
Id. at273.
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IV
APPLYING THE DOCTRINE TO STUDENT CLUBS

While Haze/wood's emphasis on public forum doctrine and school
sponsorship severely limited Tinker's reach, existing doctrine offers student clubs some limited hope for First Amendment protection. In this
Part, I apply both public forum doctrine and Hazelwood to a ban on
student clubs in order to elaborate on some of the doctrinal problems
addressed earlier as well as to suggest ways that courts addressing regulations on student clubs might distinguish Hazelwood.
A.

Public Forum Doctrine and Student Clubs

Despite their divergent outcomes, Tinker and Fraser adopted similar approaches to First Amendment questions. Both cases inquired into
the mission of an educational institution as a mechanism for determining the relative strength of the school's interest in restricting speech.
The Court then based its decision upon the degree to which the speech
threatened the mission. Public forum doctrine ostensibly supplants this
approach because it centers its constitutional inquiry not on governmental interests and objectives, but on the medium or locale where the
speech takes place.98
To understand public forum doctrine's potentially lethal consequences for speech in an educational environment, consider the case of
queer student clubs. The doctrine offers the clubs two potential safe harbors that have succeeded in post-secondary environments, but both are
fraught with problems. At the same time, both solutions pinpoint problems inherent in public forum doctrine: the definition of the "limited
public forum" and the scope of the ban on viewpoint discrimination.
First, the clubs may argue that student clubs are a limited public forum, and the school therefore may not engage in content- or
viewpoint-based discrimination. Indeed, this argument has worked with
great success in a college context,99 providing First Amendment protection to queer student groups at universities. 100 More importantly,
Hazelwood itself contains language suggesting that the use of school
facilities by student groups might constitute a limited public forum. 101

98. See Post, Between Governance and Management, supra note 19, at 1765-66.
99. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (overturning university policy of
excluding religious groups from university facilities).
100. See, e.g., Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor, 110 F.3d 1543 (I Ith Cir. 1997) (holding
statute prohibiting recognition of queer student group unconstitutional).
101. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267 ("[S]chool facilities may be deemed to be public forums
only if school authorities have 'by policy or by practice' opened those facilities 'for indicriminate use
by the general public,' or by some segment of the public, such as student organizations." (quoting
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983) (emphasis added))); see
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Unfortunately, the Court's definition of the "limited public forum"
category has rendered it all but meaningless. 102 If, as the Court asserts, a
high school, or any other government institution, can create and define
the scope of the limited public forum through its "policy and practice, mo3 a school district or the state legislature may simply include content-based exclusions in the definition of the forum, as Utah did with
clubs that "involve human sexuality." Under public forum doctrine,
courts could easily consider the Utah statute as an indication of the
state's "policy and practice"toward excluding student organizations that
"involve human sexuality," effectively removing such clubs from the
class of speakers entitled to the limited public forum's heightened constitutional scrutiny. As a result, it is increasingly difficult to determine
whether the "limited public forum" category has any real constitutional
significance, or if it has become part and parcel of the "non-public forum."
Second, even if a court treated student clubs as non-public forums, a
queer club may still argue that a ban on clubs that address human sexuality constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination. The Court has
already accepted a parallel argument in the context of college clubs,
striking down the University of Virginia's denial of funding to a
Christian student organization in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
the University of Virginia. 104 The Court's reliance, however, on viewpoint discrimination, regardless of the educational setting or the outcome for student groups, is misplaced because it is impossible to apply
the ban on viewpoint discrimination in a consistent and principled
manner.
The fact remains that the contemporary American high school is a
rich gold mine of viewpoint discrimination. 105 Consider schoolwide assemblies on a particular topic or classroom assignments that ask
also Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7 (stating that institutions may create public forums for use by student
groups).
102. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 825 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting):
The Court makes it virtually impossible to prove that a forum restricted to a particular class
of speakers is a limited public forum. If the Government does not create a limited public
forum unless it intends to provide an 'open forum' for expressive activity, and if the
exclusion of some speakers is evidence that the Government did not intend to create such a
forum, no speaker challenging denial of access will ever be able to prove that the forum is
a limited public forum.
Id. (citation omitted).
103. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; see also Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270.
104. 515 U.S. 8I9 (1995). While a ban on clubs that address human sexuality would seem to
constitute content discrimination, the Rosenberger Court held that a policy denying funding to a
student group that manifests a "belief in or about a deity or ultimate reality" constituted viewpoint
discrimination. Id. at 836. In the process, the Court recognized that the distinction between content
and viewpoint discrimination is "not a precise one." Id. at 831.
105. See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 15I, 165-67 {1996).
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students to take a particular position, like "Why Capitalism Promotes
Economic Efficiency." The assignment, though likely to survive constitutional scrutiny, 106 clearly violates the constitutional ban on viewpoint
discrimination because it effectively silences those with other viewpoints on the comparative merits of capitalism. If the Court were truly
serious about imposing an absolute ban on viewpoint discrimination,
educational pedagogy as we know it would cease to exist. While attempts to justify protection for controversial high school student organizations based upon the categorical ban on viewpoint discrimination
are doctrinally possible, such claims are particularly tenuous given the
unique nature of the school environment.
B. Hazelwood and Student Clubs

The Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed the constitutional free speech rights of extracurricular high school clubs. Moreover,
the Equal Access Act has enabled lower courts to dispose of student club
cases involving speech regulations on statutory grounds, 107 allowing
those courts to avoid ruling on any constitutional claim. Nevertheless,
there are some potential ways to distinguish Haze/wood's definition of
sponsorship and place student groups within Tinker's protective umbrella.
Most noticeably, the newspaper in Hazelwood was part of a journalism class for which the students received curricular credit. 108 The faculty adviser and principal were actively involved in the editorial
process, and the paper was widely distributed throughout the school. 109
In contrast, most student clubs do not implicate these indicia of sponsorship to the same degree. Curricular credit is rarely granted for student
club activity, and instirutional review of the speech of student clubs is,
in most cases, comparatively minimal.
Because Hazelwood offers such a broad definition of sponsorship,
however, courts cannot easily dismiss it. Hazelwood extends its reach
beyond standard curricular speech to "school-sponsored publications,
theatrical productions, and expressive activities that students, parents,
and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school." 110 If a school district can show that a club's activities "are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart

106. See, e.g., Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that
assigning a student a grade of zero for a proposed paper on the life of Jesus Christ did not violate the
student's free speech rights).
107. See supra note 23.
108. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262.
109. See id. at 261-62.
110. Id. at 271.
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particular knowledge or skills to student participants," 111 then a reviewing court would have to utilize Haze/wood's limited conception of constitutional scrutiny. Furthermore, some lower courts have shown a
willingness to extend Hazelwood beyond the confines of curricular
speech. 112
C.

The Interplay between Public Forum Doctrine and Sponsorship

The overlap between the sponsorship/toleration distinction and
public forum doctrine has been the subject of significant disagreement
among lower courts. In cases where the school demonstrates sponsorship, courts have either conducted a forum analysis 113 or simply applied
the Hazelwood test and dispensed with forum analysis entirely.114 In either approach, the outcome was fairly predictable, as the First
Amendment places few limits on the ability of schools to regulate
school-sponsored speech.
In cases involving the personal speech of students ("Tinker"
speech), however, courts have split on whether or not Tinker preempts
a forum-based inquiry. 115 Because Tinker and public forum doctrine adopt
dramatically different perspectives on the appropriate degree of judicial
deference, the applicable test has a significant impact on the First
Amendment rights of students who engage in non-school-sponsored
speech on school grounds. Several courts have applied forum analysis to
non-school-sponsored speech, 116 examining whether or not restrictions
on non-school sponsored speech are permissible in specific areas of the
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Crosby v. Holsinger, 852 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that school did not
violate FirstAmendment by banning the school's "Johnny Reb" symbol); C.H. v. Oliva, 990 F. Supp.
341, 352-54 (D.N.J. 1997) (applying Hazelwood to find that school did not violate First Amendment by
moving student's poster of Jesus to a less prominent location).
113. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood ofS. Nev., Inc. v. Clark County Sch. Dist, 941 F.2d 817 (9th
Cir. 1991) (en bane) (holding that a school-sponsored yearbook was permitted to reject
advertisements by Planned Parenthood because the yearbook was a non-public forum).
114. See, e.g., Settle Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995); Poling v. Murphy,
872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that disqualification of candidate for student council president
for insulting assistant principal in campaign speech did not violate the First Amendment); Crosby, 852
F.2d 801. There is no substantive difference between the two tests, since they both demand a
reasonable relationship between the regulation on speech and the purpose served by the forum. In the
case of schools, the purpose is to address "legitimate pedagogical concerns." Searcey v. Harris, 888
F.2d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273) (stating that there is no
difference between the two tests). However, the Court has given some recent indications that this
distinction may be meaningful with respect to the ability of school districts to engage in viewpoint
discrimination. See infra note 144.
115. See Salomone, supra note 34, at 274-92.
116. See, e.g., Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
because an elementary school is a non-public forum, the school did not violate a fourth-grader's First
Amendment rights by forbidding him from distributing invitations to a church function on school
grounds).
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school, like school hallways. 117 Others have ignored public forum doctrine altogether and applied the Tinker test, implicitly reasoning that
public forum doctrine is restricted to questions of access, not to those of
students' personal expression in places where they are already entitled
to be. 118 While the resolution of this conflict is beyond the scope of this
Comment, the problem is demonstrative of the confusion that has accompanied the application of a doctrine that deals with external access
to public space to the workings of an internally driven community.1 19

v
A CRITIQUE OF SCHOOL SPONSORSHIP

Because Haze/wood's applicability to extracurricular student clubs
is somewhat ambiguous, it is necessary for reviewing courts to examine
the underlying motivations behind the opinion. In this Part, I consider
the tremendous emphasis the Hazelwood Court placed on the issue of
sponsorship and question why the issue of sponsorship should have any
constitutional significance at all. I offer two likely rationales and explain why both fail to justify the use of sponsorship as a determinative
factor in school speech cases.
Under the first rationale, which I will call the "proprietary" justification, 120 sponsorship is significant because the school has a right to restrict speech based on its interest in the property upon which the
speech takes place or based on the school's ability to allocate its own
resources. As suggested earlier, this concept functions as the guiding assumption behind public forum doctrine. 121 Under the second, which I will
call the "attribution"rationale, schools attempt to justify content-based
exclusions of "school-sponsored" speech because the school, like any
individual or organization, may decide with what speech it chooses to
affiliate itself.

117. See Hemry v. School Bd. of Colo. Springs Sch. Dist No. II, 760 F. Supp. 856 (D. Colo.
I991) (upholding school's restriction on student distribution of religious newspaper in school
hallways).
118. See, e.g., Chandler v. McMinnaville Sch. Dist, 978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
suspension of students for their refusal to remove buttons containing the word "scab" to support
teachers' strike violated First Amendment); Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding
unconstitutional a school policy requiring pre-distribution school approval of all student-written
materials as applied to unauthorized student-written newspaper); Chalifoux v. New Caney lndep.
Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (upholding students' First Amendment right to wear
rosaries as necklaces). But see Broussard v. School Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1537 (E.D. Va. 1992)
(applying Tinker test to find no First Amendment violation in school's decision to suspend student for
wearing T-shirt saying "Drugs Suck!").
119. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
120. See generally Post, Between Governance and Management, supra note 19.
121. See supra Part 111.A.
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A. Proprietary Justification
As applied to the question of queer student groups, the proprietary
rationale goes something like this: Because the school district owns the
property on which the club wishes to meet, and because the school supplies resources to the club, the district, as a property owner or resource
provider, is entitled to preserve the property for its intended uses. Thus,
queer student groups have no constitutional rights to meet on school
property during school hours. 122 The Court has invoked this general
type of rationale on many occasions, primarily in the context of public
forum doctrine, to explain the government's ability to deny access to
property .123
For the same reasons that the proprietary rationale fails in the
public forum context, it cannot explain the Hazelwood Court's preoccupation with sponsorship. If the sole justification for sponsorship were
to protect the government's property rights, the Court would have
subjected the speech of the Tinker children to regulation merely because
the school supplied the classroom where the speech took place. Consequently, any student club or organization meeting on school property or
using school resources to facilitate speech would be subject to nearly
limitless regulation. The proprietary justification, if taken at face value,
recognizes no distinction between personal expression in a school
lunchroom and speech that somehow implicates the school. If taken to
its logical conclusion, this justification would allow a school, in the
name of promoting its desired values, to expend its resources to allow
only students with family incomes above $50,000 to participate in student clubs or to allow only the school Democratic club to meet. 124 These
types of hypothetical regulations, which present clear constitutional
problems, suggest that a school should not have a nearly unlimited
122. The question of whether queer student groups can meet after school on school property is a
fundamentally different question. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist, 508
U.S. 384 (1993) (holding unconstitutional school's denial of church's request to use school facilities
for film series); Good News/Good Sports Club v. School Dist, 28 F.3d 1501 (8th Cir. 1994)
(overturning school policy forbidding access to student religious club after school as impermissible
viewpoint discrimination); Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907F.2d1366 (3d Cir. 1990) (upholding
preliminary iajunction forcing school to allow student religious organization to rent out the school
auditorium after school).
123. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 390 ("There is no question that the District, like the
private owner of property, may legally preserve the property under its control for the use to which it
is dedicated." (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800
(1985))).
124. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870-71 (1982) ("If a Democratic school board,
motivated by party affiliation, ordered the removal of all books written by or in favor of Republicans,
few would doubt that the order violated the constitutional rights of the students ...."). While some
might view the latter regulation as impermissible viewpoint discrimination, subsequent interpretations
of Hazelwood suggest that school sponsorship allows schools to engage in viewpoint discrimination.
See infra note 144.
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license to engage in speech regulation solely based on a proprietary justification.
B.

Attribution Rationale

Under the attribution rationale, queer student groups have limited
First Amendment rights because external observers and members of the
school community may perceive the students' speech as the speech of
the school. Because the Constitution grants broad latitude for the government to select which messages it wishes to convey when the governmental entity is the speaker, 125 the school could easily subject the
club to regulation. However, the rationale fails to account for the fu11
scope of a school's authority to regulate student speech. In addition, the
justification does not account for the organizational relationship between clubs and schools and does not adequately explain the doctrinal
distinction the Court has drawn between student speech rights in high
schools and universities.
1. Underinc/usion: The Risk of Attribution Fails to Explain the Full
Scope of the School's Regulatory Power
Taken by itself, the attribution rationale cannot justify the level of
discretion granted to school authorities because the rationale is underinclusive. Consider the following hypothetical interaction in a high
school biology class:
Teacher: What does Darwin's theory of evolution say?
Student:
I know I am just expressing my own opinion here,
but I would suggest that everything Darwin said about evolution
is wrong. God created the universe and human beings, and evolution is a bunch of lies.
Teacher: That's not what I'm looking for, and I would appreciate it if you didn't bring that issue up again [effectively silencing the student].
Under current doctrine, schools retain the power to regulate such
in-class student statements made during the course of an academic exchange, 126 much like the newspaper in Hazelwood, even though the student has added a disclaimer, and there is little danger that anyone would
attribute the student's statement to the school. For in-class dialogues,
the risk of attribution is almost non-existent, but the power of school
authorities remains paramount. Clearly, the rationale is underinclusive
125. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
126. See Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995); C.H. v. Oliva, 990 F.
Supp. 341, 352-54 (D.N.J. 1997) (finding that school district did not violate First Amendment by
preventing student from reading children's Bible story to his classmates).
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because it fails to explain the full scope of the school's authority to
regulate school-sponsored speech, including the speech of student clubs.
2. The Attribution Rationale Fails to Account for the Organizational
Relationship Between Student Clubs and Their Schools
When applied to student clubs, the attribution rationale ignores the
organizational relationship between student clubs and their parent institutions. By and large, participation in a particular club is a voluntary act
initiated by an individual student. 127 Students, not faculty members or
school administrators, define the organization's agenda, allocate funds,
organize activities, elect officers, and schedule meetings. The existence
of a faculty sponsor, whose role is usually advisory and is designed to
minimize tort liability from injuries to person or property, is insufficient to implicate the school. If faculty presence alone were sufficient
to justify speech regulation, the presence of faculty members during
lunch recess or during the Tinker students' protest would justify speech
restrictions. Furthermore, schools routinely permit student groups with
divergent or conflicting objectives to meet without adopting either
group's position.
Unlike the student speech at issue in Hazelwood or Fraser, student
organizations do not generally involve speech aimed at, or distributed
to, the entire student body. 128 Consequently, the risks of implying
school sponsorship of the speech are dramatically minimized, as the
communication is only among students who are voluntary participants.129 Additionally, in contrast to the newspaper in Hazelwood, queer
student clubs have no connection to the school's curriculum. Hazelwood
involved a journalism class for which participants received curricular
credit, perhaps the most tangible representation of the school's imprimatur. The average student club, like the stamp club or the Future
Farmers of America, has a comparatively distant relationship to the
school's curriculum, which lessens the risk of attribution and provides
courts with a means for distinguishing Hazelwood.

127. This assumes that participation in student groups is voluntary and that the governance of the
clubs and content of the meetings is in the hands of students. These two criteria are crucial. If either
one is not satisfied, the student clubs become more like an academic classroom where student
attendance is mandatory and the curriculum is controlled by the institution.
128. See D. Jarrett Arp, Beyond Mergens: Balancing A Student's Free Speech Right Against the
Establishment Clause in Public High School Equal Access Cases, 32 WM. & MARY L REV. 127, 134
(1990). While it is true that many student organizations post fliers or advertisements targeting the
entire school community, the bulk of speech activity within clubs generally occurs in more private
and contained settings.
129. Cf. Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, n3 {2d Cir. 1994)
{distinguishing between curricular materials and library resources based upon the voluntariness of
student exposure).

1154

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1131

Recognizing the potential for a narrow interpretation of
Hazelwood, some lower courts have scrutinized the organizational relationship between the school and the club in order to avoid the confines
of Hazelwood's limited definition of student speech rights. For example, in Clark v. Dallas Independent School District, 130 a district court
upheld the right of a student-initiated religious club to meet before
school, overturning the school district's categorical ban on religious student organizations. The court applied the Tinker test, distinguishing
Hazelwood based upon its finding that "[t]he conduct at issue was voluntaiy, student-initiated, and free from the imprimatur of school involvement."131

3. The Attribution Rationale Fails to Account for Doctrinal
Distinctions between High Schools and Colleges
Tiying to understand the Court's preoccupation with sponsorship
becomes even more difficult when one contrasts Hazelwood with the
Court's major rulings upholding the First Amendment rights of college
student clubs. In a pair of decisions, Widmar v. Vincent 132 and
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 133 the
Court supported the rights of religious student organizations to meet
and receive funding from universities, despite sponsorship conditions in
a college context that were substantially identical to those of the average high school. Sponsorship, as a governing principle for student
speech, is therefore insufficient to explain the differences between the
First Amendment rights of high school and college students.
a. Widmar and Hazelwood
In Widmar v. Vincent, the Court overturned a state university's
policy of excluding student religious groups from using university facilities.134 Reasoning that the university had created a limited public forum
for student groups without any explicit intent to do so, 135 the Court held
that the university's regulation could not withstand the heightened constitutional scrutiny that attaches to such forums. 136
If university ownership of property or attribution risks were not
sufficient to allow for regulation of internal speech in Widmar, it is difficult to accept either rationale as the principle governing sponsorship
in Hazelwood. Furthermore, Widmar holds that educational institutions
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
13 6.

806 F. Supp. 116 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
Id. at 120.
454 U.S. 263 (1981).
515 U.S. 819 (1995).
See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277.
See id. at 267-68.
See id. at 269-77.
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can unintentionally create a limited public forum for student groups despite a "policy and practice" of excluding religious organizations, while
Hazelwood suggests that the school's policies and practices are definitive in judicial attempts to determine whether a limited public forum
exists. 137 The result of these cases leaves a court reviewing school
speech restrictions without a principled means for dealing with the constitutional rules applicable to high school student organizations under
the public forum doctrine or sponsorship analysis. Either Widmar has
no application to high schools despite similar sponsorship conditions,
or public high schools can unintentionally create a limited public forum
for student organizations in spite of existing policies and practices.
Recognizing the potential for conflict in its treatment of high
schools and colleges, the Widmar Court limited the scope of its holding
in dicta by stating that "First Amendment rights must be analyzed 'in
light of the special characteristics of the school environment"ms and
noting that college students are "less impressionable than younger students. "139 Despite the Court's limited attempts at creating a distinction,
however, the question of Widmar's applicability to public schools has
been the subject of extensive debate among the lower courts. 140 Passage
of the Equal Access Act, 141 designed to apply the Widmar decision statutorily to secondary schools, has not clarified Widmar's applicability to
public high schools in a constitutional context.
One can reconcile Widmar and Hazelwood, however, once considerations of forum classification and sponsorship are abandoned. The
central difference between the two cases is the Court's explanation of
the respective missions of universities and high schools. If the Court
accepts that the proper inquiry is not whether the speech is "schoolsponsored" or the nature of the forum, but whether the speech represents a threat to the institutional mission, Widmar and Hazelwood fit
137. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267.
138. Widmar, 454 U.S. at268 n.S. (quoting Tinkerv. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969)).
139. Id. at 274 n.14; see also Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1538 (7th Cir.
1996) ("Age is a critical factor in student speech cases.").
140. Lower courts have used the Widmar decision to find limited public forums in high schools in
a number of different contexts. See Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist, 766 F.2d 1391, 1401 (10th Cir.
1985) (using Widmar to find a limited public forum in an elementary and secondary school); Bender
v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 741F.2d538, 547 (3d Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S.
534 (1986) (holding that high school created limited public forum for extracurricular student groups
and stating, "The fact that Widmar involved a university, while we here are concerned with a high
school, does not mean that we are free to ignore the nature of the free speech rights enjoyed by
students."). But see Ceniceros v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d 1535, 1546 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding Widmar inapplicable in an Establishment Clause context); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v.
Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1045 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding Widmar inapplicable to a
public school district).
141. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1994).
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together quite nicely. In Widmar, the Court simply found the restrictions incompatible with the mission of higher education to promote
intellectual dialogue and debate. In Hazelwood, the Court dealt with a
different mission at the secondary school level and found the restriction
consistent with larger objectives of value inculcation.
b. Rosenberger: Student Clubs and Governmental Speech

In Rosenberger, the Court struck down the University of Virginia's
policy of denying funding to student groups that promoted or manifested beliefs "in or about a deity or ultimate reality." 142 The
Rosenberger majority held that governmental expenditure of resources
to student organizations to encourage a diversity of viewpoints must
conform to higher constitutional safeguards for free speech, including a
ban on viewpoint discrimination. 143 Curiously, both the majority and
dissent relied on Hazelwood for the proposition that the government
may engage in both content and viewpoint discrimination with respect
to its own speech. 144
Two relevant insights emerge from Rosenberger's use of
Hazelwood. First, the fact that the Rosenberger Court regarded the
Hazelwood newspaper's speech as the speech of the school shows that
the Court views attribution as the governing rationale behind school
sponsorship. 145 Second, by suggesting that schools may engage in viewpoint-based as well as content-based discrimination, the Court indicates
that public forum doctrine, which subjects viewpoint discrimination to

142. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 825 (1995).
143. See id at 836-37.
144. See id at 834 (citing Hazelwood for the proposition that "[a] holding that the University
may not discriminate based on the viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates does not
restrict the University's own speech, which is controlled by different principles"); id at 892-93 n.11
(Souter, J., dissenting) (using Hazelwood to voice agreement with majority's distinction between "a
State's use of public funds to advance its own speech and the State's funding of private speech,
suggesting that authority to make content-related choices is at its most powerful when the State
undertakes the former"). Rosenberger's use of Hazelwood reflects the Court's misunderstanding and
current confusion over public forum doctrine and its application to internal speech. Hazelwood
indicated that the school newspaper was a non-public forum, a designation that still carries with it a
restriction against viewpoint discrimination. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 268-70. However, under the
Court's revisionist history, the nature of the forum appears to be irrelevant and schools may engage in
content and viewpoint discrimination once sponsorship is demonstrated. See Muller v. Jefferson
Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1542 (7th Cir. 1996) ("(A] school need not tolerate student expression
of viewpoints which are fundamentally 'inconsistent with its basic educational mission."' (quoting
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266)). But see Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1319 n.7 (11th Cir. 1989)
("Although the Supreme Court did not discuss viewpoint neutrality in Hazelwood, there is no
indication that the Court intended to drastically rewrite First Amendment law to allow a school official
to discriminate based upon a speaker's views .... Hazelwood acknowledges a school's ability to
discriminate based on content not viewpoint.").
145. See supra note 144.
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strict scrutiny, is not relevant to high school student organizations that
fall within the scope of Hazelwood.
In adopting the attribution rationale, the Court assigns itself the
task of determining whether or not the sponsorship of student clubs,
either by providing access to school property or by providing funding,
constitutes government speech. Again, the Court has set the scene for
the doctrinal equivalent of an eighteen-car pileup. In both Rosenberger
and Widmar, the Court regarded collegiate student groups as entities
separate from the larger institution. The Court then conducted a forum
analysis to determine the degree of constitutional scrutiny and inquired
into the constitutionality of the content- and viewpoint-based nature of
the institutional policies. In essence, it treated the speech of college
student clubs as external speech within a limited public forum. If the
attribution rationale is applied to Hazelwood, however, it appears that
the opposite holds true in a high school environment: The speech of
student groups is part of the speech of the school. As a result, the government, as speaker, may engage in both content- and viewpoint-based
discrimination, and public forum doctrine is rendered almost irrelevan t.146
In order to understand just how much is at stake for queer student
groups in the relationship between the speech of clubs and the speech of
schools, Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor141 is particularly instructive. In Pryor, the Eleventh Circuit held unconstitutional an
Alabama statute that prohibited the recognition or funding of any collegiate student group that "fosters or promotes a lifestyle or actions prohibited by the sodomy and sexual misconduct laws.m 4s Relying upon
Rosenberger, the appellate court held that a limited public forum existed for the funding of student groups and that the statutory regulation
on gay student groups constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination.149 Under Rosenberger's conception of Hazelwood, a similar holding protecting the rights of a high school queer student group to meet
would be difficult under the attribution rationale, because the government is the speaker and is therefore permitted to engage in viewpoint
discrimination. 150
146. See supra note 125 and accompanying text
147. 110 F.3d 1543 (11th Cir. 1997).
148. Id. at 1545.
149. See id. at 1548-50; see also Gay and Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 366-68
(8th Cir. 1988) (overturning university's denial of funding to gay student organization as
impermissible content-based discrimination under Widmar); Gay Students Servs. v. Texas A&M
Univ., 737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984) (overturning state university's refusal to recognize gay student
organization).
150. Adding to the confusion, lower courts that have chosen to apply a forum analysis to the
speech of high school student clubs implicitly ignore the attribution rationale. By using a forum
analysis, those holdings suggest that organized student activities do not necessarily implicate
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If attribution alone is the only way to explain the constitutional
importance of sponsorship, there is no principled reason to create constitutional distinctions, as the Court has done, between student groups in
high schools and colleges. In both environments, the parent institution
provides space to meet and funding for activities. Institutionally and
organizationally, there is little difference. Yet, in the high school context, club sponsorship is considered governmental speech, while in the
collegiate context it is not. 151 This suggests that the doctrinal distinction
between high school and college student organizations has nothing to do
with questions of sponsorship, governmental speech, or the nature of
public forums, but with the Court's beliefs about the respective missions
of secondary and post-secondary education.

4. Mergens: Maturity and Sponsorship
One potential explanation for the Court's decision to treat high
schools and colleges differently is an assumption that high school students (and, often, their parents) are not mature enough to understand
that when a school "sponsors" a student club, it does not adopt the
club's speech as its own or endorse the club's speech. This explanation,
however, flies in the face of the Court's holding in Board of Education
of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens. 152 In Mergens, the Court
upheld an excluded high school Christian club's right to meet under the
Equal Access Act. 153 While Mergens is not a constitutional free speech
case, it recognized, in an Establishment Clause context, the ability of
high school students to distinguish between school "endorsement" of
religious speech and school toleration.
[F]ear of a mistaken inference of endorsement is largely selfimposed, because the school itself has control over any impressions it gives its students. To the extent a school makes clear
that its recognition of respondents' proposed club is not an endorsement of the views of the club's participants, students will
reasonably understand that the school's official recognition of
the club evinces neutrality toward, rather than endorsement of,
religious speech. 154
By stating that high school students are mature enough to understand that the presence of a religious student organization does not
government speech when they occur on school property. If it were government speech, there would
be no need for a forum analysis.
I51. Indeed, the same question can be asked of public forum doctrine. If student groups are
limited public forums at the college level, why not at the high school level?
152. 496 U.S. 226 (I990).
153. See id at 253. Because the case was decided on statutory grounds, the Court declined to
address the First Amendment free speech issue. See id
154. Id at 25I (citation omitted).
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constitute "endorsement" for Establishment Clause purposes, Mergens
casts further doubt upon the attribution rationale. If high school students are mature enough to understand that there is no "endorsement"
under the First Amendment religion clauses, it is difficult to comprehend how they are not mature enough to understand lack of
"sponsorship" for student organizations in a free speech context. Not
only does this logic undermine Widmar's suggestion about the different
maturity levels of high school and college students, 155 but it demonstrates yet another difficulty in identifying a doctrinally consistent governing principle that governs Hazelwood's distinction between schoolsponsored and school-tolerated speech.
Thus far, I have argued that Hazelwood's focus on school sponsorship to determine constitutional protection is without merit. In the
next Part, I argue that the Court should return to a mission-based paradigm for student speech and that it has implicitly followed this approach all along.
VI
ADOPTION OF A MISSION-BASED RATIONALE

To rehabilitate First Amendment doctrine in secondary schools,
the Court should abandon its current focus on school sponsorship and
public forum doctrine. Instead, the Court should return to the course it
adopted in Tinker, Pico, and Fraser; that is, it should conduct an inquiry
into the institutional mission of the school and scrutinize the relationship between the mission and the regulation on speech. In essence, this
proposal adopts a similar approach to the one used in the Court's
rights-based jurisprudence. The "governmental interest" is the pursuit of
an organizational mission, and the "tailoring" is the relation between
the mission and the contested regulation on speech. In adopting this
revised focus, however, the Court should view the mission of American
education not as an absolute dichotomy between value inculcation and
the fostering of an independent mind, but as a continuum, recognizing
that educational institutions often pursue both goals simultaneously.
In looking to the mission, courts should recognize that the ultimate
value of speech is not in its relation to doctrinally inconsistent con-.
cerns related to property or attribution. Rather, its value derives from
the way that freedom of speech helps or hinders our social commitment
to public education. Implicit in this argument is a belief that the ultimate value of free speech depends upon the social and organizational
context of the speech, rather than amorphous commitments to selfgovernance or a marketplace of ideas. 156 Consider, for example, speech
155.
156.

See supra notes 138-139 and accompanying text
See Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, supra note 19, at 1276-77 ("Instead of
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on a military base. The government maintains wide latitude to regulate
speech by military personnel based upon security and discipline concerns that directly relate to the organizational mission. 1s7 This includes
speech that, in another social or organizational context, might be entitled to constitutional protection against state regulation.
When one considers the value of speech in the American high
school, First Amendment jurisprudence should reflect the competing
institutional concerns. On one hand, we want schools to perform their
assigned mission free from the constricting effects of judicial review.
Public schools exist, at least in part, to disseminate information and
civic values determined by the political communities attached to the
school. To fulfill that mission, schools must maintain some authority to
constrain discourse that competes with or potentially dilutes the communicative product of this educational mission. Otherwise, it would be
impossible for schools to function, with pedagogical concerns giving
way to adolescent cacophony.
At the same time, free speech assumes a distinctive and unique importance in an educational context, protecting both institutional and
extra-institutional values for three reasons. First, schools exist as miniature communities within a larger sociopolitical community that has
codified its values of pluralism and open political discourse into law. As
part of their role to prepare students for civic engagement, schools
have an institutional interest in promoting free speech in order to inculcate these larger social values. Second, schools have an interest in
equipping students with the critical thinking skills necessary to participate as social and political beings in a marketplace of ideas and identities. This interest is particularly important in the American high
school, given the formative role of adolescence in the psychological
development of individual identity. 1ss If our teenage years play an important role in who we become as adults, exposure to a wide range of
ideas during these years is essential to an individual's civic evolution.
Third, schools have an interest in promoting a process of selfrealization for its own sake, above and beyond enabling individual participation in a larger political process. The very notion of individual
liberty suggests that there is an inherent value in the search for selftruth, both as a necessary predicate for a larger process of collective

aspiring to articulate abstract characteristics of speech, doctrine ought to identify discrete forms of
social order that are imbued with constitutional value, and it ought to clarify and safeguard the ways
in which speech facilitates that constitutional value.").
157. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980); Post, Behveen Governance and
Management, supra note 19, at 1770-71.
158. See ERIK ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 261-63 (2d ed. 1963).
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realization and as part of a utilitarian notion of maximizing individual
happiness. 159
A mission-based test would focus the Court's attention, not on irrelevant proprietary or attribution concerns, but squarely on the crux of
the matter-the reconciliation of conflicting institutional objectives
that affect the appropriate role of free speech in an educational environment. In fact, this focus on the institutional mission is precisely the
approach the Court has already adopted once the sponsorship rhetoric
is stripped away. Witness the Court's underlying preoccupation with the
mission of American education in Tinker and Hazelwood. The Tinker
Court arrived at its holding after identifying the mission of the school
and determining whether or not the students' Vietnam War protest affected the mission. The "Tinker test" is specifically designed to extend
constitutional protection only to the point that the speech substantially
affects the institution's pedagogical imperatives. Likewise, in
Hazelwood, the Court's holding reflects a concern that unlimited journalistic discretion would severely harm the school's mission of value
inculcation identified in Fraser and Pico. 160 Haze/wood's crucial error
was not in protecting the school's right to engage in value inculcation
free from judicial scrutiny. Instead, the Court erred by viewing value
inculcation as the sole mission of secondary schools and by promulgating a constitutional test that did not demand any meaningful relationship between the mission and the regulation on speech.
Under a mission-based lens, the distinctions between the rules applied by Tinker and Hazelwood begin to blur. The difference is not the
use of public forum doctrine or whether the speech is school sponsored.
Instead, the cases are merely a continuation of the Court's earlier reevaluation of the mission of American education combined with a shift
in the degree of judicial restraint necessary to allow schools to accomplish that mission. Differing conceptions of the mission of education
also underlie the comparatively heightened scrutiny the Court applied
to post-secondary environments in Widmar 161 and Rosenberger. 162
Thus, the proper constitutional questions-even under existing
doctrine-are the mission of the institution, the relationship between
the mission and the regulation on speech, and the circumstances under
159. See generally Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L REV. 591 (1982).
160. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 (envisioning the role of schools as "a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment" (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
493 (1954))).
161. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at267 n.5 ("The college classroom with its surrounding environs is
peculiarly the marketplace of ideas." (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972))).
162. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835 (discussing the importance of protecting First Amendment
principles in "the University setting, where the State acts against a background of tradition and
thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition").
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which the Court defers to school authorities in seeking to carry out that
mission by regulating speech. Because of the competing missions present in an educational context, resolution of these constitutional questions places heightened demands on courts reviewing the
constitutionality of speech regulations of high school student clubs.
VII
APPLYING THE MISSION TEST TO STUDENT GROUPS

A. What Is the Mission?
By adopting a bipolar paradigm for identifying the institutional
mission, the Supreme Court has skewed the constitutional analysis to
the point that it no longer adequately addresses the real organizational
and pedagogical issues presented by the American educational system.
Instead of recognizing that most schools adopt a dual pedagogical mission-the inculcation of values and the fostering of an independent
mind-the Court has implied that the mission must be either one or the
other.
The Court should instead view the mission of American education
as a continuum, with value inculcation on one side and the fostering of
an independent mind on the other. Some school activities advance the
value inculcation mission by communicating a defined body of information. These activities generally, but not always, include invited speakers,
schoolwide assemblies, and most curriculum-related activities. Because
value inculcation is part of a school's mission, courts should subject institutional regulation in these contexts to minimal judicial scrutiny in
order for the school to achieve this objective.
There are other school activities, however, for which the goal is
not to codify or communicate values or information, but to encourage
students to explore their independent identity and to define their own
interests or passions. Student clubs serve precisely these purposes. They
present an opportunity for students to explore interests or identities, as
a stamp collector, a scuba diver, a Republican, a Muslim, an African
American, or a lesbian. Far from the school dictating a code of fixed
conduct, the objectives and areas of focus for each club are defined by
the students. Attempting to place student clubs within the same mission
as value-inculcating activities provides for constitutional convenience,
but it does not accurately reflect the complexity of American education, the diverse pedagogical objectives contained within the school environment, and the need for First Amendment protection to allow
students to accomplish some of those objectives.
A federal district court used similar mission-based logic to uphold
the constitutional rights of students to distribute a non-schoolsponsored religious newspaper on school grounds in Rivera v. East Otero
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School District R-1: 163 "High school students ... must develop the ability to understand and comment on the society in which they live and to
develop their own sets of values and beliefs .... [I]nhibitions on individual development defeat the very purpose of education in secondary
schools.m 64
Furthermore, this mission-based approach finds some doctrinal basis in the concept of the limited public forum. Under that doctrine, the
Court has recognized that institutions are capable of creating, intentionally or otherwise, environments that exist to promote free expression. Consequently, their ability to regulate speech in these
environments is limited. Unlike public forum doctrine, however, the
mission-based test relies upon the larger institutional objectives of
schools and the value of speech in relation to those objectives, rather
than the stated policy and practice of the school in the particular forum
or a distinction between content and viewpoint discrimination.
B.

When Is It Appropriate for Courts to Interfere?

Student clubs exist at an awkward point between institutional commitments to promote the exploration of individual identity and to reinforce often hostile community values. 165 Schools seeking to regulate the
clubs' speech will undoubtedly argue that the regulation exists to further
the schools' mission of value inculcation. As a result, under a
mission-based test, the constitutional issue hinges upon the degree to
which courts are willing to place the school's own conception of its
mission under scrutiny.
Should courts take schools at their word? This question requires a
case-by-case inquiry, dependent upon (I) the extent to which the school
has delineated the specific information or values that it wants to communicate, and (2) the degree to which the school's actions create the
objective impression that the transmission of values or information is
163. 721 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Colo. 1989).
164. Id. at 1194.
165. It is worth noting that several states have responded to issues related to queer youth in more
positive ways. Some have adopted statutes that prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in their
schools. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 89 (West 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.12
(West 1996); 22 PA. CODE§ 5.4 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 16, § 565 as defined in VT. STAT. ANN.
tit 16, § ll(a)(26) (West 1995); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 118.13 (West 1996). Passage of this legislation
has ushered in a new era of queer activism with high school students playing an active role in
lobbying legislators. See Sara Rimer, Gay Rights Law for Schools Advances in Massachusetts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 1993, at A18. A recent Seventh Circuit case, Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th
Cir. 1996), demonstrates how much is potentially at stake for school districts that fail to adopt
inclusive policies. Jamie Nabozny's classmates subjected him to repeated anti-gay harassment See
id. at451. When the school district took no remedial action, Nabozny filed a lawsuit See id. at 45152. After the appellate court held that Nabozny had a cognizable claim, the school district settled out
of court for $900,000. See $900,000 Won By Gay Man in Abuse Case, N.Y. TtMEs, Nov. 21, 1996, at
811.
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the purpose of the activity. Consider the free speech rights of a student
in math class. The existence of a geometry textbook and a stateauthorized class curriculum suggests that the school is communicating
specific knowledge about geometry. Furthermore, schools allocate the
bulk of classroom instructional time to the transmission and discussion
of this fixed body of information. As a result, a regulation on student
speech in math class should receive minimal judicial scrutiny unless that
regulation extends beyond what is needed to allow the school to transmit the information.
With student clubs, the scenario is very different. As self-governing
units, the clubs are only rarely designed as vehicles for schools to convey specific information or values. Furthermore, the existence of multiple clubs that range across a wide spectrum of interests and ideological
perspectives indicates that the inculcation of specific values is not the
objective furthered by student club activities. As a result, courts should
consider student clubs as part of the school's mission to encourage exploration of independent interests and identities and hold regulations on
most student groups, including queer student groups, unconstitutional
because the regulations do not advance the mission.

C.

Queer Student Clubs Under Hazelwood

Even if one accepts Haze/wood's premise that schools have one
uniform mission, queer student organizations are no more threatening
to that uniform mission of value inculcation than any other student
group. The presence of a queer student group does not imply that the
school "approves" of a particular sexual orientation as part of its desired
value system any more than it adopts or endorses the ideological agenda
of the Young Republicans. 166 Courts should not grant constitutional
camouflage for schools to create empty distinctions between queer student groups and other clubs whose purpose is to provide students with a
sense of racial, gender, or ethnic identity. Like the Latino Students
Union or the Irish Heritage Club, queer student groups provide their
members with a sense of history and cultural identity, along with an atmosphere of support in an often hostile high school environment.
Furthermore, when one considers the cumulative effects of club
bans, it is difficult to understand how the regulation of queer clubs serves
the "legitimate pedagogical objective" of value inculcation. Rather than
sending a message condemning the discussion of human sexuality, state
166. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 ("[A]n open forum in a public university does not confer any
imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices .... [S]uch a policy 'would no more
commit the University ... to religious goals' than it is 'now committed to the goals of the Students for
a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance,' or any other group eligible to use its facilities."
(quoting Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d I310, 1317 (1980))).
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statutes like the one passed in Utah impair the educational, psychological, and social development of queer teens. While bans at the elementary and junior high school level may be age appropriate, there is every
indication that high school students can and do ponder questions related
to human sexuality on a deeply personal level. 167 A majority of gays and
lesbians report experiencing same-sex attraction and arousal before the
age of sixteen. 168
The school's pedagogical imperatives become more dubious when
one considers the vulnerable nature of the population in question. 169 Gay
and lesbian youth are significantly more likely to attempt suicide than
their straight counterparts. 170 The failure of educational institutions to
provide a supportive environment is among the factors that place queer
youth at such tremendous social risk. 171
D.

High School Hate Groups

One potential by-product of a mission-based test is the extension
of First Amendment protections to a hypothetical Nazi student group
or the non-hypothetical Students Against Faggots Everywhere. If part
of the mission of public schools is to foster a student's independent
consciousness, why should that mission not extend to a student who
wishes to explore his identity as a Klan member or a homophobe?
Indeed, at least one federal district court has already adopted this
position in a high school context. In Pyle v. South Hadley School
Committee, 172 two sons of a constitutional law professor challenged their
high school's dress code provisions, which banned clothing that (1) contained lewd or vulgar comments, (2) harassed or demeaned others based
upon their sex, color, sexual orientation, or membership in other protected groups, or (3) advertised alcoholic beverages, tobacco, or drugs. 173
167. See generally AARON FRICKE, REFLECTIONS OF A ROCK LOBSTER: A STORY ABOUT
GROWING UP GAY (1981).
168. See Dennis A. Anderson, Lesbian and Gay Adolescents: Social and Developmental
Considerations, in THE GAY TEEN: EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE AND THEORY FOR LESBIAN, GAY AND
BISEXUAL ADOLESCENTS, supra note 3, at 17-18.
169. See Amy Lovell, "Other Students Always Used to Say, 'Look at the Dykes"': Protecting
Students from Peer Sexual Orientation Harassment, 86 CALIF. L REV. 617, 623-28 (1998).
170. See Blumenfeld, supra note 3, at 217 ("The earlier a young person is aware of same-sex
attractions, the greater the problems they face and the more likely they are to develop suicidal
feelings and behaviors."); Paul Gibson, Gay Male and Lesbian Youth Suicide, in U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON YOUTH SUICIDE
3-110 (Marcia R. Feinleib ed., 1989) (stating that lesbian and gay youth are two to three times more
likely to attempt suicide and that those suicides may constitute 30 percent of all completed youth
suicides). But see Lovell, supra note 169, at 626 n. 48 (giving overview of critiques of Gibson's
methodology).
171. See Gibson, supra note 170, at3-128.
172. 861 F. Supp. 157 (D. Mass. 1994).
173. See id. at 163.
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Over the course of a year, the brothers arrived at school dressed in a
number of different T-shirts, bearing legends ranging from "Coed Naked
Band; Do it to the Rhythm," and a depiction of two male soldiers kissing along with the inscription "Read My Lips," to a homemade "Coed
Naked Censorship-They do it in South Hadley'' T-shirt. 174
The Pyle court upheld the school's "vulgar and lewd" provision under Fraser but declared the "harassment" provision unconstitutional as
impermissible viewpoint discrimination. 175 While the T-shirt of the two
men kissing might be permissible (if not found to be vulgar or lewd),
"[a] T-shirt carrying a depiction objecting to homosexuality, on the
other hand, would be flatly forbidden by the code." 176
An in-depth discussion of the constitutionality of hate speech provisions, as well as the applicability of RA. V. v. City of St. Pau/1 11 to
public schools, is beyond the scope of this Comment. I would suggest,
however, that under a mission-based test, schools could potentially
regulate these groups within constitutional boundaries because their
presence detracts from the school's mission to promote the independent exploration of interests and identities. High school hate groups, unlike queer student groups, exist almost solely to prevent others from
engaging in self-expression. If the purpose behind allowing student
groups is to assist students in defining their interests or identities, the
First Amendment should protect this interest. Because the existence of
hate groups aetively prevents schools from advancing this mission,
regulation of hate groups is needed to enable the school to further organizational objectives.
In making this argument, I distinguish the mission advanced by student clubs from the mission Professor Robert Post refers to as
"democratic education" 178 or "critical education." 179 "Democratic education" sees the "purpose of public education to be the creation of
autonomous citizens, capable of fully participating in the rough and
tumble world of public discourse"; 180 "critieal education" prioritizes education's role in the discovery of truth, which requires an unfettered exchange of ideas. 181 Both of these notions envision the educational
mission in terms of its benefit to the larger society, whether as a training ground for the political process or as part of a larger seareh for
174. See id at 161-63.
175. See id at 170-73.
176. Id. at 172.
177. 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (declaring city hate speech ordinance unconstitutional as impermissible
viewpoint discrimination).
178. Post, Racist Speech, supra note 19, at 321.
179. Id. at322.
180. Id at 321.
181. See id at 322.
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truth. As a result, Professor Post argues that constitutional protection
extends to hate speech, since the speech acts to further the institutional
mission. 182
By viewing the value of self-realization exclusively as a means to
achieve larger goals, however, Professor Post's classifications ignore
the value of self-realization as an end in itself. By relying upon rhetoric
of fear and intimidation, hate speech directly inhibits the search for
self-truth. If, as I briefly argued earlier, 183 the process of self-realization
has an inherent value, and if hate speech inhibits that process, then
some regulation of hate speech is appropriate to protect First
Amendment values of self-realization in an educational context.
The argument to deprive student hate groups of First Amendment
protection has a number of obvious and potentially fatal problems. If
the basis for distinguishing the self-expression of gay students from the
expression of Nazi students is that the latter's rhetoric is designed to
quash the self-expression of others, could a fundamentalist Christian
student organization not offer the same critique of a gay/straight alliance? In response, one could attempt to distinguish between speech and
action, protecting the speech rights of hate groups only up until the
point that it results in disruptive actions targeted at other students. Alternatively, one could condition constitutional protection based upon
the group's own conception of its objectives, creating a distinction between a hypothetical Straight Alliance and Students Against Faggots
Everywhere based upon the degree to which their stated mission challenges the self-expression of others. If, however, a basic distinction between hate groups and queer student clubs is untenable, Tinker's
"material or substantial disruption" test should provide an adequate
safeguard to ensure that hate group activity does not significantly intrude on the rights of other students. 184
CONCLUSION

As gay and lesbian youth become more vocal and visible throughout American society, both inside and outside our schools, high school
administrators and school district officials will be faced not only with
new challenges, but with an opportunity to address the overwhelming
needs of a long silent and underserved segment of the school population. High schools, like other institutions, must reckon with the increased recognition of sexual diversity within modem life.
182. See id. at 322-24.
183. See supra text accompanying note 159.
184. See Phillips v. Anderson County Sch. Dist Five, 987 F. Supp. 488 (D.S.C. 1997) (applying
Tinker test to find that school did not violate student's First Amendment rights by requiring student to
refrain from wearing a jacket made to look like a Confederate flag).
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Apart from policy concerns, queer student organizations will present courts with the opportunity to reevaluate their approach to First
Amendment doctrine, in terms of school speech, the forum-based approach, and questions of sponsorship. Adoption of a mission-based continuum model would not only address the underlying doctrinal concerns
and provide a more solid foundation for categorical First Amendment
analysis, but would more accurately reflect the complex organizational
structure and pedagogical objectives of the American high school.

